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Religious Access to Public Programs and
Government Funding
Dean M. Kelley*
I. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

This paper concerns the theme of "access," which puts
religious claims for admission to the public arena on the same
basis as other players. This characterization creates a winsome
tilt in the direction of fair play, sounding in equal protection,
such that anyone suggesting otherwise has an uphill task not
to sound churlish and ill-natured. This paper contends that,
although religious organizations may be welcome to participate
in various public efforts to serve the common good, so long as
they do not use participation as an occasion for proselyting or
institutional aggrandizement, they are not entitled to
government funding except in certain narrowly circumscribed
conditions that are the subject of much debate.
Because the debate is wide-ranging, it is necessary to set
the limits of this paper. On the one hand, no one is seriously
proposing that government support the churches and pay their
clergy, nor would such a proposal be taken seriously if made.
Whatever the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.I
means, the last such arrangements for governmental support of
churches in this country were terminated long ago by the few
original states that had them. 2 New states were not admitted
to the Union unless their constitutions conformed with the
federal principle on this subject. 3 On the other hand, few
people this side of Madalyn Murray O'Hair are contending that
religious organizations should be disqualified as such from
* Counselor on Religious Liberty, National Council of Churches, since 1960;
A.B. University of Denver, 1946; Th.M. Iliff School of Theology, 1949; author of
five-volume treatise, THE LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA, forthcoming
from Greenwood Press.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 ANSON P. STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES 75, 77-78 (1964) (Connecticut in 1818 and Massachusetts in 1833).
3 ld. at 154-55.
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making important contributions to the achievement of public
objectives of the common good through their efforts in
education, health care, moral reform, and ethical advocacy. The
main disputes-at least for purposes of this paper-concern
what role hybrid institutions founded, sponsored, and
maintained by religious bodies play in publicly funded
programs. Hybrid institutions are not exclusively or
predominantly "religious" in the way that churches,
synagogues, and mosques are thought to be; they are not as
exclusively religious as the law sometimes supposes, 4 but are
also educational, medical, or social-welfare institutions as well.
Hybrid institutions are the present-day reminders that
Christian churches were actively concerned with education,
health care, and charitable succor of the needy. This active
concern extended beyond their own members to the population
in general. The concern occurred long before governments
showed any general solicitude for the non-elite or any
consistent responsibility for those functions. Even when
government was concerned, it often called upon churches to
discharge the responsibility, as the state-sponsored churches in
France preferred to make use of nurses from Roman Catholic
orders or Protestant deaconess houses. 5 It is government, not
churches, that are the Johnny-come-latelies in these fields. As
such, it is more than a little presumptuous for governments to
be undertaking to instruct churches-via elaborate and often
unrealistic and even self-contradictory regulations-how to do
the work they were doing long before government took an
interest in it. But that argument is independent of government
funding, though it does have some implications for this
discussion.

4 "The churches . . . themselves are not 'exclusively religious' in the sense
that the . . . regulations require of their 'integrated auxiliaries.m Charles M.
Whelan, "Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problems, 45
FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 899 (1977).
5 4 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 517 (15th ed. 1974).
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DISTINGUISHING EDUCATION AND WELFARE

The law on religious access in the United States is
curiously bifurcated between hybrid institutions of religion
with education and hybrid institutions of religion with welfare.
More accurately, the division is between institutions of religion
with primary/secondary education and institutions of religion
with higher education or welfare. A quick recapitulation of the
law will make the distinction clear.

A. Welfare and Higher Education
The first case testing the application of the Establishment
Clause to a hybrid institution was Bradfield v. Roberts. 6 That
case involved the construction of an isolation ward on the premises of Providence Hospital with funds of the District of Columbia. Providence Hospital was owned and operated by the
Sisters of Charity of the Roman Catholic Church. The Supreme
Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to that grant
in a rather wooden opinion based upon the following suppositions: (a) perusal of an organization's charter of incorporation
reveals all that needs to be known about its nature and operation; (b) the mode of operation of a hospital is commonly known
and generally recognized; (c) the religious beliefs of the proprietors thereof do not have any effect upon that mode of operation; (d) ecclesiastical supervision or control is not present, or if
present does not affect its mode of operation; (e) the religious
beliefs of the proprietors are not only irrelevant to the operation of the hospital, but it would be improper for the court to
take cognizance of them; (f) the concern of the court with the
establishment of religion is exhausted if the institution's charter makes no mention of religion and its services are not "confined to the members of that church"7 ; and, (g) the institution
in question is subject to the control, not of the church, but "of
the Government which created it" [in the sense of granting its
corporate charter]. 8
None of these suppositions would be generally accepted
today and should not have been accepted in 1899. Certainly no
religious body should accept the assumption that its ethical
teachings and religious requirements do not have, cannot have,

6 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
7 ld. at 298.
8 !d. at 297-99.
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and should not have any consequences for the operation of a
hospital it owns and ostensibly manages. On the other hand,
the embodiment of religious and moral norms in health care
institutions-supported in part by public funds and treating
non-adherents of that religion who may not subscribe to those
norms-poses significant Establishment Clause questions with
which some lower courts have struggled, 9 but with which the
Supreme Court has not. Bradfield set the standard by which
U.S. courts have since generally dealt with challenges to government funding of hybrid institutions of religion and welfare. 10 In time, the Court also applied this type of analysis to
higher education. 11

B. Elementary and Secondary Education
The case law dealing with elementary and secondary education followed a rather different course, after recognizing that
private schools-both religious and non-religious-have a right
to operate. 12 The Supreme Court found no Establishment
Clause impediment in the public school district's supplying
parochial school students with secular textbooks 13 or bus
transportation. 14 Everson v. Board of Education 15 elicited the
Supreme Court's first effort to spell out systematically what the
Establishment Clause requires, In Everson, the Supreme Court
formulated the so-called "no aid" test, stating that
[t]he "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to
or to remain away from church against his will or force him
to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can

9 Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975); Chrisman v.
Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974); Ward v. St. Anthony
Hosp., 476 F.2d 671 (lOth Cir. 1973); O'Neill v. Grayson County War Memorial
Hosp. Ass'n, 472 F.2d 1140 (6th Cir. 1973); Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n,
413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969); Meredith v. Allen County War Memorial Hosp. Ass'n,
397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968); Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 319 F. Supp. 252
(D.C. 1970).
10 See infra text accompanying note 58.
11 See infra note 56.
12 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
13 Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
14 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
15 !d.
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be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended
to erect "a wall of separation between church and State." 16

Although the Everson formulation was repeated three times, 17
it fell into desuetude until reasserted in 1989 by a narrow
majority in County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburh
Chapter. 18

Ill.

THE LEMON TEST: APPUCATION TO EDUCATION
AND WELFARE

A.

The Lemon Test

In 1971 the United States Supreme Court conceived of
another way to apply the Establishment Clause. Whether it
replaced or supplemented the earlier "no aid" test was not clear
until the five-member majority in Allegheny reiterated the "no
aid" formula from Everson and characterized the test in Lemon
v. Kurtzman 19 as an effort to refine it: "First, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."o2o In Lemon the Court
found that various state programs that benefited parochial
schools did not pass the test because the efforts by the state to
monitor those programs to ensure that no aid was given to
religion created excessive entanglement between the state and
religion. 21 This approach has been called a "catch 22" test by
some members of the Court. 22
16 ld. at 15-16 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
17 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S.
488 (1961) (no dissent); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
18 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
19 403 u.s. 602 (1971).
20 ld. at 612-13 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
21 ld. at 613-14. For a counterargument to this characterization, see discussion infra part III.D.l.
22 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615-16 (1988); Aguilar v. Felton, 473
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B. Higher Education
On the same day in 1971 that the Court announced the
result in Lemon, it also issued a decision affecting church-related higher education in Tilton u. Richardson, 23 reaching an
opposite conclusion. The decision held that government aid to
colleges was permissible, finding that religiously affiliated colleges were not pervasively sectarian in the way that parochial
schools were. The distinction rested on findings that the colleges were not primarily engaged in religious indoctrination; their
students were more mature and thus less susceptible to indoctrination, and they were not required to attend college by compulsory education statutes. 24 While these distinctions may be
pertinent, they do not cut neatly between the Twelfth and Thirteenth years of schooling. Since then, decisions on Establishment issues in higher education have followed Tilton, such
as Hunt u. McNair 25 and Roemer u. Board of Public Works, 26
while lower education cases have, by and large, followed the
course set by Lemon.

C.

The Parochial School Cases

Mter the Supreme Court struck down in Lemon a program
from Rhode Island for supplementing the salaries of parochial
school teachers for teaching secular subjects 27 and a program
from Pennsylvania for the purchase of "secular education services" from parochial schools, 28 various states sought ways of
easing the financial burdens of parochial schools that the Supreme Court might find acceptable, but without much success.29

U.S. 402, 420-21 (1985) (Rhenquist, J., dissenting).
23 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
24 ld. at 685-86.
25 413 u.s. 734 (1973).
26 426 u.s. 736 (1976).
27 DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp 112 (D.R.I. 1970), a({'d, Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
28 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp 35 (E.D. Penn. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S.
602 (1971).
29 See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek
v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Public Funds for Pub. Sch. v. Marburger, 417
U.S. 961 (1974); Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974); Sloan v. Lemon, 413
U.S. 825 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
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Some thought a breakthrough had occurred (whether viewing it with approval or alarm) when the Supreme Court sustained a Minnesota plan permitting a tax deduction to parents
for expenditures for education whether in private or public
schools in Mueller v. Allen. 30 But two years later, programs
from New York and Michigan that sent public school teachers
into parochial schools were struck down by a bare majority on
the grounds that the teachers might be led by their parochial
surroundings to introduce sectarian teaching into their
work. 31 The rationale was unconvincing since it is hard
enough to get parochial school teachers to teach religion in
parochial schools, let alone public employees. The Court's effort
to apply Lerrwn to increasingly subtle and ingenious programs
produced increasingly splintered results. A striking example is
Wolman v. Walter, 32 which required a fifty-four-fold table to
report the votes of nine justices on six programs.
The Court has been unwilling to ban all forms of aid or to
permit all forms of aid. Instead it has been groping between
these extremes for a way to recognize and assist the public
services rendered by parochial schools without opening the
gates to such substantial or direct subsidization as would clearly be state support to religious bodies for the advancement of
their religions. One rationale the court has used is the child
benefit theory, under which secular textbooks and bus transportation are made available to all children regardless of the
schools they might attend. 33 That theory formed the rationale
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 34
which was the first program of substantial federal aid to education and which included some parochial students in its benefits.
It has informed the Court's later decisions, such as Wolman, 35
where resources that a pupil might be able to obtain from a
public library were permissible, but larger resources, such as
sets of encyclopedias and globes of the world-that would not

U.S. 756 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S.
472 (1973).
30 463 U.S. at 388.
31 Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 402; Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 373.
32 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
33 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 118-19 (1947); Board of Educ.
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968).
34 Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 20 U.S.C.).
35 433 U.S. at 229.
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be obtainable by individual pupils-were deemed institutional
acquisitions and were not allowed. 36
Some members of the Court have found some of the Court's
distinctions perplexing, if not anomalous, and indeed the justices in the majority have not always been very articulate in explaining their reasoning. 37 However, a pattern is discernible
in the Court's decisions: the Court has generally invalidated
direct monetary transfers to parochial schools and the grant or
loan of equipment that would enhance the institution or expand its realty. Similarly the Court has generally rejected the
assignment of public employees to parochial school premises,
though its rationale was not as persuasive as another might
have been: i.e., that such programs have the effect of expanding
the staff of the school with adjunct personnel that in effect add
to its faculty. Whether the Court will move in the direction of
approving so-called ''voucher" plans for enabling parents to
choose among public and private schools remains to be seen.
The most recent such decision of the Court, Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District, 38 may be a straw in the wind pointing toward acceptance of a "voucher" arrangement. In Zobrest,
a deaf high school student was denied the services of a signlanguage interpreter solely because he attended a religious
school. The Supreme Court held that the student could not be
denied such publicly-financed services to which he was entitled
solely because he chose to use them at a sectarian school. This
holding, said the Court, flowed from the earlier decisions of
Mueller v. Allen39 and Witters v. Washington. 4° From these
earlier cases the Zobrest Court derived the principle that any
benefit flowing to the sectarian institution did so as a result of
individual choices of recipients who were free to use them at
any school, public or private, and any such benefit was incidental to the aid program and did not violate the Establishment
Clause. 41
"Pervasively sectarian" is the shorthand rubric the Court
has used for its distinction between those church-related agen-

36 Id.
37 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985) (Rhenquist, J., dissenting).
38 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
39 463 u.s. 388 (1983).
40 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (holding that a blind student entitled to educational
aid could not be denied it because he wanted to use it for tuition at a Bible college for training as a missionary).
41 Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2466-68.
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cies that can receive direct government aid and those that
cannot. Parochial schools are said to be so pervasively sectarian
that any aid they receive would inevitably redound to the advancement of their religious purpose. 42 Institutions of higher
education are not thought by the Court to be of that character,
nor are social welfare or health care agencies, as evidenced in
the Court's most recent wrestling with this issue, which involved a program that had elements of both welfare and education. That is the case of Bowen v. Kendrick. 43
D.

Bowen v. Kendrick

At issue in this 1988 decision was the Adolescent Family
Life Act (AFLA), 44 a 1981 program of federal grants to public
and nonprofit private agencies "'for services and research in
the area of premarital adolescent sexual relations and pregnancy."'45 The grants were for "two types of services: 'care services,' for the provision of care to pregnant adolescents and adolescent parents, and 'prevention services,' for the prevention of
adolescent [pregnancy ]."46 Among these services were some
described as "necessary services": "pregnancy testing and maternity counseling, adoption counseling and referral services,
prenatal and postnatal health care, nutritional information,
counseling, child care, mental health services, and . . . 'educational services relating to family life and problems associated
with adolescent premarital sexual relations.' '>4 7 The program
was designed to "serve several purposes, including the promotion of 'self discipline and other prudent approaches to the
problem of adolescent premarital sexual relations,' . . . the
promotion of adoption as an alternative for adolescent parents,"
and other valuable services. 48
In addressing these problems, Congress looked beyond
governmental action, stating:

42 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 610-13 (1988). For the text of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's proposition, see infra note 60 and accompanying text.
43 487 U.S. at 589.
44 42 U.S.C. § 300z (1988).
45 Bowen, 487 U.S. at 593 (quoting S. REP. No. 161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1981)).
46 !d. at 594 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z-l(a)(7), (8) (1988)).
47 !d. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300z-l(a)(4) (1988)).
48 !d. at 593 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300z(b)(l) (1988)).
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[S]uch problems are best approached through a variety of
integrated and essential services provided to adolescents and
their families by other family members, religious and charitable organizations, voluntary associations, and other groups in
the private sector as well as services provided by publicly
sponsored initiatives; .... 49

Grant applicants must describe how they would involve these
various entities in the provision of the services funded by the
Act. 5°
Federal taxpayers and others brought the Bowen suit,
charging that the Act violated the Establishment Clause. The
federal district court applied the Lemon test and found that the
Act failed to pass the second prong. It had the direct and immediate effect of advancing religion because it expressly required
grantees to involve religious organizations in the provision of
services. The Act permitted religious organizations themselves
to be grantees, thus enabling them with federal funds to teach
adolescents about issues that could be considered "fundamental
elements of religious doctrine," and contained no restrictions
whatever against the teaching of "religion qua religion" or the
inculcation of sectarian doctrines. 51 The court also concluded
that because AFLA funds were used largely for counseling and
teaching, overly intrusive monitoring would be needed to insure
that religion was not advanced by such programs, thus violating the "excessive entanglement" prong of the Lemon test. For
these reasons, the court found the Act unconstitutional on its
face and as applied. 52
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, and the
opinion of the five-member majority was delivered by Chief
Justice Rehnquist. That opinion followed the district court's
approach of viewing the statute "on its face," 53 and, using the
same Lemon test, reached an opposite result. The Court concluded that "the services to be provided ... are not religious in
character,"54 and that Congress was not precluded from enlisting the help of religious organizations-along with nonreligious
organizations-in solving the problems to which the Act was

49
50
51
52
53
54

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.

at
at
at
at
at
at

595 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §300z(a)(8)(B) (1988)).
596.
598-99.
598-99.
598.
604.
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addressed. 55 The Court quoted one of its higher-education cases to underscore this point: "'[R]eligious institutions need not
be quarantined from public benefits that are neutrally available to all."'56 This was a quintessential expression of the "access" concept.
The Bowen Court relied on Bradfield v. Roberts 57 for the
proposition that a church-related hospital could be aided in
providing health care services because its affiliation with a
church did not "alter the purely secular legal character of the
corporation, particularly in the absence of any allegation that
the hospital discriminated on the basis of religion or operated
in any way inconsistent with its secular charter."58 The Court
went on to say that even if the statute was neutral on its face,
care must be taken that "direct government aid to religiously
affiliated institutions does not have the primary effect of advancing religion."59 The Court assured that result by utilizing
the "pervasively sectarian" rubric:
One way in which direct government aid might have that
effect is if the aid flows to institutions that are "pervasively
sectarian." We stated in Hunt [v. McNair] that "[a]id normally
may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion
when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed
in the religious mission .... "
In this case, nothing on the face of the AFLA indicates
that a significant proportion of the federal funds will be disbursed to "pervasively sectarian" institutions .... [W]e do not
think the possibility that AFLA grants may go to religious
institutions that can be considered "pervasively sectarian" is
sufficient to conclude that no grants whatsoever can be given
under the statute to religious organizations. We think the
District Court was wrong in concluding otherwise.
Nor do we agree with the District Court that the AFLA
necessarily has the effect of advancing religion because the
religiously affiliated AFLA grantees will be providing educational and counseling services to adolescents. Of course, we

55 ld. at 606-07.
56 ld. at 608 (quoting Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736,
746 (1976)).
57 175 u.s. 291 (1899).
58 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609 (1988) (paraphrasing Bradfield, 175
U.S. at 298).
59 ld.
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have said that the Establishment Clause does "prohibit government-financed or government-sponsored indoctrination
into the beliefs of a particular religious faith," and we have
accordingly struck down programs that entail an unacceptable risk that government funding would be used to "advance
the religious mission" of the religious institution receiving
aid . . . . But nothing in our prior cases warrants the presumption adopted by the District Court that religiously affiliated AFLA grantees are not capable of carrying out their
functions under the AFLA in a lawful, secular manner. Only
in the context of aid to "pervasively sectarian" institutions
have we invalidated an aid program on the grounds that
there was a "substantial" risk that aid to these religious institutions would, knowingly or unknowingly, result in religious
indoctrination.
We also disagree with the District Court's conclusion
that the AFLA is invalid because it authorizes "teaching" by
religious grant recipients on "matters [that] are fundamental
elements of religious doctrine," such as the harm of premarital sex and the reasons for choosing adoption over abortion .... [T]he possibility or even the likelihood that some of
the religious institutions who receive AFLA funding will
agree with the message Congress intended to deliver to adolescents through the AFLA is insufficient to warrant a finding
that the statute on its face has the primary effect of advancing religion .... The facially neutral projects authorized by
the AFLA-including pregnancy testing, adoption counseling
and referral services, prenatal and postnatal care, educational
services, residential care, child care, consumer education,
etc.-are not themselves "specifically religious activities," and
they are not converted into such activities by the fact that
they are carried out by organizations with religious affiliations.60

The Court took note of the fact that there was no explicit
prohibition in the text of the Act against the use of federal
funding for religious purposes, but the Court observed that
there was also "no intimation in the statute that at some point,
or for some grantees, religious uses are permitted."61 Having
determined that the Act was constitutional on it face, the Court

60 ld. at 610-13 (citations omitted).
61 ld. at 614.
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remanded the case to the district court to determine whether it
was being applied in a constitutional manner.
Justice O'Connor, who was clearly the majority's swing
vote, wrote a concurring opinion that suggested some sympathy
for the views of the minority:
[A]ny use of public funds to promote religious doctrines violates the Establishment Clause ... , [and] extensive violations-if they can be proved in this case-will be highly relevant in shaping an appropriate remedy that ends such abuses. For that reason, appellees may yet prevail on remand, and
I do not believe that the Court's approach entails a relaxation
of "the unwavering vigilance that the Constitution requires
against any law 'respecting an establishment of religion.' "62

Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote a concurring
opinion to try to narrow the scope of the remand. He insisted
that if AFLA funds were shown to be going to a few "pervasively sectarian" institutions, that should not invalidate those
grants. 63 He maintained that "[t]he question in an as-applied
challenge is not whether the entity is of a religious character,
but how it spends its grant."64

1. The dissent's view in Bowen
Justice Blackmun presented a vehement dissent, joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. He began with several examples of AFLA grantees' engaging in explicitly religious
indoctrination of persons coming to them for federally funded
services. 65 He found fault with the majority's analysis that
focused on the words of the statute and thus did not confront
the array of evidence of "real-world events" that spelled out the
Act's operation. 66 The majority had virtually disregarded the
entire record compiled in the court below and had contented
itself with "assumptions and casual observations about the
character of the grantees.'.s7 He also found fault with the
majority's use of the "pervasively sectarian" rubric as a way to
avoid dealing with the actual operation of a wide range of reli-

62
63
64
65
66
67

ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.

at
at
at
at
at
at

623 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting the dissent).
624 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
624-25 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
625-26 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
627-28 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
629 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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giously affiliated organizations, in which on a "continuum of
'sectarianism' running from parochial schools at one end to the
colleges ... in Tilton, Hunt and Roemer at the other, the AFLA
grantees described by the District Court clearly are much closer
to the former than to the latter."68
The Court's decision, he insisted, was a "sharp departure
from our precedents."69 Aid programs providing "nonmonetary,
verifiably secular aid" had been upheld more readily in the past
than direct cash subsidies, which required much closer scrutiny
to make sure that the funds were not used to advance religion. 70 But AFLA authorized "various forms of outreach, education and counseling services . . . in ways previously held
unconstitutional.'m For instance, the Court had previously
approved the purchase for use by pupils in parochial schools of
secular textbooks approved for use in public schools, whereas
there was no such requirement regarding teaching materials
purchasable under AFLA. Justice Blackmun stated:
The AFLA, unlike any statute the Court has upheld, pays for
teachers and counselors, employed by and subject to the direction of religious authorities, to educate impressionable young
minds on issues of religious moment ....
. . . Whereas there may be secular values promoted by
the AFLA, including the encouragement of adoption and premarital chastity and the discouragement of abortion, it can
hardly be doubted that when promoted in theological terms
by religious figures, those values take on a religious nature.
Not surprisingly, the record is replete with observations to
that effect. It should be undeniable by now that religious
dogma may not be employed by government even to accomplish laudable secular purposes ....
. . . There is a very real and important difference between running a soup kitchen or a hospital, and counseling
pregnant teenagers on how to make the difficult decisions
facing them. The risk of advancing religion at public expense,
and of creating an appearance that the government is endorsing the medium and the message, is much greater when the
religious organization is directly engaged in pedagogy, with

68 !d. at 631-33 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
69 !d. at 634 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

70 ld.
71 Id.
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the express intent of shaping belief and changing behavior,
than where it is neutrally dispensing medication, food or
shelter. 72

Justice Blackmun also disagreed with the majority's characterization of the "entanglement" prong of the Lemon test as a
"catch 22." 73 Noting that it was still part of the Court's Establishment Clause standard, he wrote, "[t]o the extent any
metaphor is helpful, I would be more inclined to characterize
the Court's excessive entanglement decisions as concluding that
to implement the required monitoring, we would have to kill
the patient to cure what ailed him." 74 In conclusion, Justice
Blackmun addressed the statute in terms of Justice O'Connor's
"endorsement" analysis:
The AFLA, without a doubt, endorses religion . . . . [T]he
statute creates a symbolic and real partnership between the
clergy and the fisc in addressing a problem with substantial
religious overtones. Given the delicate subject matter and the
impressionable audience, the risk that the AFLA will convey
a message of Government endorsement of religion is overwhelming. The statutory language and the extensive record
. . . make clear that the problem lies in the statute and its
systematically unconstitutional operation, and not merely in
isolated instances of misapplication. I therefore would find
the statute unconstitutional without remanding to the District Court. 75

IV.

CRITIQUE AND COMMENTARY

The judiciary has difficulty dealing with institutions and
activities of a mixed character, where religious functions and
purposes are mingled with secular functions and purposes.
Indeed, some functions or purposes may at the same time be
both secular and religious. The courts have trustingly embraced
the simplifying fiction that the secular can be sorted from the
religious easily and clearly in religiously affiliated hospitals,
colleges, and social-welfare institutions, though not in parochial
schools. But by neatly dividing the aid-eligible sheep from the
non-eligible goats (and figuratively throwing the latter off the
72
73
74
75

ld. at 638-41 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
ld. at 649 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
ld.
/d. at 652 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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fleeing droshke to the wolves to save the former), this fiction
may do a disservice to both sides. Parochial schools do perform
secular functions, on the one hand, and church-related welfare
agencies and colleges are not as devoid of religious purposes,
atmosphere, and activities as the fiction might suggest. That is
one reason, presumably, that Congress thought religious agencies might have a uniquely effective contribution to make in
modifying adolescent motivation and behavior intended in the
AFLA. But if only those church-related agencies that are indistinguishable from their "secular counterparts" are eligible to
participate in the program, how is the unique contribution of
the religious agency to be made? The expectation that religious
agencies, in order to qualify for federal aid under the Act, will
be duly sanitized of any religious elements is the other half of
the judicial fiction. If the fiction becomes fact, and the religious
agencies are sanitized of any religious elements, then the
unique contribution that religion might make could well be
eliminated.
This paradox simply underscores the anomaly of
government's hiring churches to perform "secular" services for
the public. If the churches remain true to their religious mission, the government will be paying for religious as well as
secular services and will thereby be aiding in the promulgation
of religion. But if churches drop the religious part of their
work, they may be failing their own distinctive role (and may
not do the secular part too well either). However, the churches
may have founded and maintained some of these "mixed" entities precisely to serve the common good in a nonsectarian way
and not be seeking to advance religious or sectarian purposes
thereby. In those instances the churches would not object to the
sanitizing of such institutions in order to qualify for federal
resources that would enable them to serve those in need in the
general population and to serve more of them and serve them
better.
If that is indeed the case with certain church-related agencies and institutions, then they can be set aside as not posing a
church-state problem. Those are the instances in which the
judicial fiction is not fiction but fact, and in those instances the
entities are-for all practical purposes-virtually secularized.
Along that path have gone Yale, Harvard, Princeton, ColumbiaPresbyterian Hospital, Methodist Hospital (of Brooklyn, of
Indianapolis, etc.) and many others. They were not secularized
solely by the attractions of tax support, though that has been
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the express purpose of the reorganization of Fordham University and other institutions founded and operated by religious
orders that have put lay persons on their boards of trustees.
When an institution seeks to appeal to a broader public for its
clientele and support, it begins to shape itself to fit the expectations of that broader public and so becomes less responsive to
the intentions of the founding church. That process is an inevitable gravitational gradient that will draw the institution
away from the church because it requires greater energy to
maintain the institution as an effective religious entity than to
succumb to the pressures for conformity to the expectations of
the general public. The strictures that rightfully accompany
governmental support only make that process of secularization
more rapid.
So a church that wishes to maintain a religious thrust and
content to its institutions of education or welfare is making
that task much harder for itself by accepting the support of the
public fisc and the requirements that properly go with it. But,
some may ask, is that the look-out of the state? If the church
wants to take that risk, why not let it? Is it the responsibility
of the courts, in applying the Establishment Clause, to keep
the churches and their institutions "pure and undefiled?"
Thomas Jefferson thought it was. In his famed Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (in Virginia) he argued: "it [state
sponsorship of religion] tends to corrupt the principles of that
very religion it is meant to encourage ... ; though indeed these
are criminal who do not withstand such temptation, yet neither
are those innocent who lay the bait in their way." 76 James
Madison, in his opposition to Patrick Henry's bill for public
support of teachers of the Christian religion, insisted that that
proposal was improper "[b]ecause experience witnesseth that
ecclesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity
and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation.'177 The
entire thrust of both these seminal historic adjurations was
that government had no business offering preferences and
emoluments to religious bodies, whether they accepted them or
not. That conviction is firmly endorsed by many Americans

76. ROBERT T. MILLER & RONALD B. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRAUTY: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 740 (4th ed. 1992).
77. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 67 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
(citing JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS AsSESSMENTS 'II 7 (circa June 29, 1785)).
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today who adhere to the dicta in Everson that government
cannot "pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions or
prefer one religion over another.'178
The very terms on which church-related schools and agencies are allowed access to public programs and government
funding are designed to render them nonsectarian and
spiritually innocuous-virtually identical with the public and
nonreligious private entities to which they should be a corrective, examplary and challenging influence. How can they offer
their distinctive and unique witness and service if they are
wired into the very structure that needs improvement? On the
other hand, they can play a more ameliorative role as light or
leaven by preserving their own faith-fueled and gospel-formed
devotion to selfless service that-at its best-has marked the
churches' contribution to human welfare through the centuries,
primarily when they have been reliant upon the volunteer
efforts of the faithful.
There are those who would resolve the paradox by allowing
the church-related institutions or agencies to retain their full
religious character, even though supported in part by government funding. That was the solution effected by Congress in
the aptly designated Church Amendment (named after Senator
Frank Church, D-ldaho). That amendment permitted churchrelated hospitals to refuse to allow sterilization or abortions
even though funded by Hill-Burton funds "if the performance of
such procedure ... is prohibited by the entity on the basis of
religious beliefs or moral convictions.''79 Somehow that logic
did not seem to apply to Bob Jones University, which lost its
tax exemption for trying, as a corollary of its faith, to prohibit

78. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (emphasis added). The
most recent official expression on this subject by a major Protestant body was the
Policy Statement adopted by the 200th General Assembly of the Presbyterian
Church, covering a wide range of church-state issues and stating that
[s]ince each state guarantees the right to a free public elementary and
secondary education and maintains universally accessible institutions for
that purpose, we oppose as a matter of public policy the use of substantial public funds to support private educational systems, including tax
deductions or credits and use of educational vouchers.
God Alone Is Lord of the Conscience, POLICY STATEMENT, 200TH GEN. ASSEMBLY,
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, U.S. 32 (1988).
79. Health Programs Extension Act of 1973 § 401(b), PuB. L. No. 93-45, 87
Stat. 91 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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interracial dating and marriage among its students and faculty.so

V. THE EDGE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
Religious liberty means that religious bodies and their
adherents should be able to pursue their faith-related goals,
chosen patterns of devotion, and obedience to their spiritual
vision without outside interference or inhibition, so long as
they do not clearly jeopardize public health or safety or the like
rights of others. That is the message of the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment81 (or it was until the Supreme
Court revised it on April 17, 1990, in Employment Division v.
Smith 82 ). But when they take the whole population into partnership in that enterprise through some form of tax support,
the situation changes, and the Establishment Clause, which is
the other half of the First Amendment's provision about religion, comes into play. The message of the Establishment
Clause is that government should not sponsor or promote the
promulgation of any religion or show favoritism for one religion
over another or favor religion over the absence of religion.
But how does that happen if government simply allows the
tax dollars of a portion of the population to finance the services
they need-and to which they are entitled-in institutions in
which they are "at home" and feel more comfortable than they
would in the sterile, or even amoral, settings of public institutions? For example, elementary schooling is one of the most
vital services in modern society and is required by law for all
children. It is a service that many public institutions are not
doing very well, partly because of bureaucratization, unionization, and homogenization, partly because of the strictures that
apply to tax-supported institutions (nondiscrimination, due
process, "sunshine" rules, etc.), and partly because they must
accept and try to teach the children that no one else wants to
teach. If private, including church-related, schools want to
share in public revenues, they are buying into the same structure and conditions that produced some of the ailments of public education. The way to avoid those ailments is to avoid one of
the main causes, the public fisc and its requirements.

80. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
81. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
82. 494 u.s. 872 (1990).
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That is not the only consideration. In the Nineteenth Century, as elementary education was becoming systematized and
publicly supported, churches faced a significant policy choice.
How would they carry on their task of inculcating the faith in
the children of the faithful? Protestants, by and large, were
content to continue supplementing general education (in the
burgeoning public schools) by religious education in the church
on Sundays. It was easy for them to make that choice because
they were the dominant element in society, and the public
schools at the time reflected their religious views and culture.
They felt "at home" in the public schools in a way that Roman
Catholics and Jews did not; in fact, the public schools were
almost like "parochial schools" for the Protestant majority. So
Roman Catholics (and later some of the more orthodox Jews)
undertook the herculean task of setting up private elementary
schools for the general and religious education of their children.
So well have they succeeded that today their schools are often
outperforming the public schools.
But if the decision should now be made to provide public
support for those private schools, it would mean that the public
would be aiding and advancing one particular mode of religious
education to the disadvantage of those religious groups who
had put their reliance in another mode. The natural consequence would be that other religious groups would be drawn to
the favored mode of inculcation (as many of them are already,
even without public subvention). Public schools would fall even
farther behind, having to try to teach the dwindling population
composed increasingly of the most intractable pupils rejected
by the various private systems and with dwindling resources to
do so. This would not only be catastrophic for the education of
the public as a whole but would be detrimental to the private
schools themselves if they began, as they surely would, to suffer some of the same strictures that have afflicted public
schools, because they would begin to become subject to some of
the same causes.
The same principles apply, perhaps less acutely, to the
fields of welfare and higher education. If churches are trying to
do something inspired by their faith-vision, something unique
and significantly different from the generally accepted way of
doing things, then they are asking for trouble by going into
partnership with the government. However inviting the prospect, and however accommodating the government may seem to
be (at the time), tax rrwney is political money. The rules may
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change without notice after the church has grown into a pattern of dependency that no longer leaves it as free to choose
another path. Partnerships with government are unequal partnerships because the government is always the senior partner.
These are unstable partnerships because the slope of dependency increases with time, leaving the church less and less able to
effectuate its original spiritual vision, with a continuous attenuation of its proprietorship.
There are those who imagine ingenious new ways to work
out such partnerships that are designed to mitigate these hazards, but the bottom line is that the government remains accountable for the use of public resources and so it cannot simply abandon responsibility for what the private partner does.
On the contrary, it is the nature of bureaucracy to centralize,
rationalize, routinize, and systematize that for which it is responsible, and to expand the area of its responsibility. Sooner
or later the private partner finds itself pressed into an ever
smaller compass, devoting more and more of its attenuating
energies to carrying out routine administrative tasks and less
and less to embodying its spiritual vision. Therefore, the course
of wisdom for any church-related enterprise seeking to pursue
a spiritual vision might be to avoid like the plague any entanglement with government.
Whether a church eschews the path of dependency on government or not, citizens of other faiths and those of no faith
have a legitimate concern that the resources, which they contribute under duress of law to serve the common good, are not
used in such a fashion as to advance religious doctrines that
they do not share or to aggrandize the institutions that promulgate those doctrines, either through enhancing the realty or
expanding the personnel thereof. As Thomas Jefferson wrote in
the Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom:
[T]o compel [anyone] to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is
sinful and tyrannical; that even the forcing him to support
this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion, is depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions
to the particular pastor whose morals he would make his
pattern, and whose powers he feels most persuasive to righteousness.83

83. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947) (quoting 12 Hening,
Statutes of Virginia 84 (1823)).
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And James Madison likewise advised:
Who does not see that the same authority which can establish
Christianity ... may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians ... ? That the same authority which
can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him
to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?B4

In addition, if government contracts with private, religiously affiliated providers for public services that citizens of various
faiths or of no faith may need, some citizens may resist going
to what they may view as a false or alien faith-group for those
services. While adherents of the provider's faith-group may find
that setting more comfortable, non-members may find it correspondingly uncomfortable. If the argument about comfort works
in the first instance, it cuts both ways. The upshot is that no
one should have to go to or through a religiously affiliated
entity to obtain the civic benefits to which he or she is entitled.
This means that there should be public or nonsectarian private
alternatives available for the provision of civic welfare or educational services.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Religious people and organizations have vital contributions
to make to society. They should be encouraged to make
them-mainly on a volunteer basis. For the public to pay areligious body to do so introduces an element that, sooner or
later, will impede the religious body in making its distinctive
contribution that flows from its spiritual vision and will inhibit
the civic community from developing nonsectarian sources for
meeting the needs of all its citizens. While contracts for services with religiously affiliated providers may be a useful way for
the civic community to meet its needs on a short-term or emergency basis, in the long run such arrangements are inherently
unstable, unequal, and detract from the ability of both church
and state to fulfill their respective functions.

84. ld. at 65 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (quoting MADISON, supra note 77,

'II 3).

